{"id":43776,"date":"2026-11-13T10:59:21","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T10:59:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/publication\/quo-vadis-reasons-first-from-weight-monism-to-weight-pluralism-to-thresholds\/"},"modified":"2026-11-13T10:59:21","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T10:59:21","slug":"quo-vadis-reasons-first-from-weight-monism-to-weight-pluralism-to-thresholds","status":"publish","type":"publication","link":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/publication\/quo-vadis-reasons-first-from-weight-monism-to-weight-pluralism-to-thresholds\/","title":{"rendered":"Quo vadis, reasons first? From weight monism to weight pluralism to thresholds"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In this paper, I discuss and explore two responses to problems that arise for a simple, weight monist version of reasons first in the practical domain. These responses\u2014weight pluralism and threshold reasons first\u2014attempt to provide a more nuanced account of reasons and all-things-considered deontic statuses. The first problem for weight monism is that it lacks the resources to predict the intuitively correct deontic statuses for the agent&#8217;s options in cases of supererogation, of practical latitude, and of moral dilemmas. The second problem is that weight monism cannot distinguish requirements from oughts. I sketch how weight pluralists try to do justice to the problem cases, as well as to distinguish requirements and oughts, by introducing several independent dimensions of a reason&#8217;s weight. However, as I argue, weight pluralism faces problems of its own\u2014it cannot uphold the entailment from requirement to ought (on some variants); it problematically casts ought as an evaluative notion (on another variant); and it undermines the action-guidingness of reasons. In the end, I explore a more sophisticated weight monist alternative, threshold reasons first, that holds some promise to avoid all of these problems.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In this paper, I discuss and explore two responses to problems that arise for a simple, weight monist version of reasons first in the practical domain. These responses\u2014weight pluralism and threshold reasons first\u2014attempt to provide a more nuanced account of reasons and all-things-considered deontic statuses. The first problem for weight monism is that it lacks the resources to predict the intuitively correct deontic statuses for the agent&#8217;s options in cases [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"publication-type":[30],"publication-year":[1680],"class_list":["post-43776","publication","type-publication","status-publish","hentry","publication-type-article","publication-year-1680"],"acf":[],"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication\/43776","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/publication"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication\/43776\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=43776"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"publication-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication-type?post=43776"},{"taxonomy":"publication-year","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lamarr-institute.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publication-year?post=43776"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}